The research in question aims to develop an investigation into the issue of subjectivity, whose central question can be posed as follows: Why is madness such a complex problem for society? When investigating the subjectivation practices of the subjects, having as an initial theoretical reference the works of Michel Foucault, in particular, the studies about psychiatric power and the modes of subjectivation-objectification, it was possible to perceive that the answer to this question permeates several instances of the knowledge, not only knowledge about madness, but also knowledge about the construction of truth, psychiatric power and subjectivity. Due to these problems, the research of this research aims to denote the importance of a critical reflection on the way these modes of subjectivation relate to madness and the discourse of truth about it. Based on the theoretical-philosophical basis of the analysis of these Foucaultian studies about psychiatric power and subjectivity, we sought in the second moment of this investigation to turn to the panorama of the subjectivity of madness in Brazil in the twentieth century, under the perspective of the thought of psychiatrist Nise da Silveira and her psychiatric work with schizophrenics, because both the Brazilian psychiatrist, as Foucault, demonstrate confluences of thoughts that represent a break with the paradigms of institutional violence of the crazy subject.

This paper aims to analyze the theme of the Face in Emmanuel Levinas. This theme gives the author a certain exclusivity since there is no historical precedent to approach it from a philosophical perspective. From there, themes inherent to the philosopher, such as infinity and ethics, corroborate the fullness of our intent. In this sense, the Levinasian itinerary acquires a new characteristic centered on the figure of the other, within an Ethical – Metaphysical perspective - where the epiphany of the face already claims responsibility. Being one of the central themes in Levinas; philosophy, the responsibility for the Other transcends the ontological view proposed by the philosophical tradition, which has its apex in Heidegger and inverts the dynamics of being, sensitive to totalizing interpretations, presenting a new view from the exteriority with ethical meaning. The other that is there, in its radical exteriority, is the one who is different from me where I can do everything about him, including denying his right to exist.

However, it is also the one for whom I cannot do anything. That is, I cannot evade the responsibility that its face demands. The radicality of Levinas; thought goes beyond the immanent condition of being and opens a fissure in the horizon of being, unveiling the face of Otherness and, from there, permeating the horizon of the infinite. In this sense, our proposal converges with the dynamics of Levinas; thought where ethics is the first philosophy and its realization is an immanent demand.

This academic work aims to discuss the concept of political liberty in Niccolò Machiavelli's thought. Based on the assumption that Machiavelli is a republican thinker, we identify liberty as the government of laws (Ordini), which is why the core of the proposed reflections will revolve around the Discourses on the first decade of Titus Livius. To achieve the proposed objective, first we will reflect on liberty in three essential moments in a city (republic): its
birth, its expansion and its corruption. At first, the mixed constitution is defended as being the best organization for a city, whether instituted at once or gradually over time, considering the events within the city. In the second moment, the participation of the people stands out, as this allows the city to conquer new territories, expanding its domain over neighboring cities. In the third moment, we reflect on the corruption of the political body, pointing out
its causes and concluding that liberty will hardly resist when its corruption becomes generalized.

The present work is intended to study the influence of the global organisms created in the last century and their intervention at the Nation’s sovereignty, based on the study of Habermas’ work”. From Kant’s inspiration in his “Perpetual Peace”, the international society unites itself in organisms with the goal to make the war an unlawful way to solve conflicts, besides universalizing determined basic rights. That situation generates a problem when faced by the freedom of the sovereigns countries to create their own law. The unlimited global power can be the object of desire of the imperialist nations, using those organisms to impose their agendas globally. Therefore, the work intends to comprehend those relations and the danger of a global tyranny, derived from a global Constitution. The constitutionalization of the International law under the pretext of the protection of the human rights, as proposed by Habermas, matches with the idea of a imperialist and colonialist west, that imposes it’s values and normativity, considered as universal ways to be recepted by the “rest” of the planet.

Our work intends to study what Bergsonian philosophy has bequeathed to us about the problem of God. To do this, we will go through some of the French philosopher's main works. Firstly, we will investigate what Bergson says about this topic in the “Psychology and metaphysics classes”, where we will see him comment on some of the main metaphysical theses that tradition has brought us. In these classes, we will find a somewhat traditional approach to philosophy, which closely follows Kant's criticism of the claims of theodicy and concludes, together with the Prussian master, for the existence of divinity based on a moral argument. After that, we delve into Bergson's main works, which gave him the popularity he enjoyed. In “Matter and memory”, we will study the theory of degrees of duration and the relationships between spirit and matter, from which we will conclude, in addition to a sui generis dualism, the existence of degrees of duration greater than those that characterize us and, therefore, ultimately, the existence of a more tense consciousness, which we understand to be already a reference to divinity. Next, we will see in “Introduction to Metaphysics” Bergson distinguishing between intellectual and intuitive knowledge, the latter having our interior as its privileged object. It would be through intuition that we could go through the different degrees of duration that constitute us. Again, at the limit, it would be possible to think of a higher consciousness, which contracted the entire history of the world in a few moments, what Bergson will call “eternity of life”, in opposition to the traditional conception of God as non-temporal, an idea that he will call of “eternity of death”. In our second chapter, we will investigate the work “Creative Evolution”, where we will find the concept of vital elan and the process of genesis of matter from an act of inversion of the spirit. God will then appear properly as creator, occupying the summit of the Real, and being named as “Supraconsciousness”. Finally, our third chapter will deal with Bergson's last book, “The Two Sources of Morality and Religion”, where we will see him move through the concepts of static religion and dynamic religion, closed morality and open morality, concluding by the existence of a privileged experience, which would allow human beings to be certain about God in an experiential way and no longer in a purely logical way.

This work is about the nature of contradiction in Arthur Giannotti in the context of logic and dialectics in contemporary capitalism based on his theoretical-philosophical analysis of Friedrich Hegel, Karl Marx and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Critical of the absolute principle of non-contradiction and apophantic predication, Giannotti also analyzes the limits of contradiction in the Hegelian conceptual substance. When looking for Marx's inversion and overcoming of Hegel, he finds solutions based on an interpretation of the notion of expanding expressiveness and the concept of language games from the second Wittgenstein. Contradictions in regulated, specific and expressive practices are in Giannottian interpretation those in which the indeterminacies of specific errors can alter the initial language game in its own exercise when a contradiction arises. If a rule is set for a game, and by following it we contradict ourselves, then it is there, by contradicting our own rule, that lies the problem and the philosophical activity of contradiction. It is a philosophical problem because the contradiction is linked to the conditions of a living language that can be verified in its arbitrary contexts. It considers the level of everyday life in which imperfections arise, which are not, therefore, from the world, but from the links that can transform signals, mere traces of language, into signs, that is, into rules of a language exercise. Contradiction exerts meaning in a world that is indifferent to the grammatical rules in language games, which may or may not follow the rule by taking bipolarity as a sign of the meaning of useful objects. It supports a “change in aspect” of the expression of a new perception accompanied by the expression of the unchanged perception. In criticizing capitalism, Giannotti distinguishes the specifically capitalist categories of its becoming, considering the becoming of logical situations instead of the vulgar empiricism of the scientific — therefore a philosopher, not a scientist. Its categories are based on practical logos, as a form of expression, which is the action itself and the possibility of its normative correction, both identitarian and contradictory. Its categories have in the practical logos, as a form of expression, the action itself and the possibility of its normative correction, both identitarian and contradictory. In these terms, the contradiction only occurs for Giannotti if there is fetishistic alienation, which steals the production of meaning from a necessary illusion. Fetishism appears from money (monopoly of the general equivalent), which reifies the meaning of individual work as a concrete case of a norm that appears as autonomous in the production and exchange of goods. It is the operation of the presupposition being replaced as a concrete fact, and the supposed being placed as an abstraction. Because of this, the philosopher describes the grammar of capital for contradiction, a way of living in which the capitalist rule sets its own case and effects its self-valorization (capital valorization).

We argue in this research that Cartesian hyperbolic doubt is an philosophical thought experiment. The understanding of the great philosophers we used for this study, many including specialists in Cartesianism - not to mention the brilliant interpretation made by Martial Gueroult - provides us with a sufficiently worthy theoretical/philosophical and critical reference for such a conception defended by us throughout this investigation. Far from being an empirically executed doubt, it is a doubt that should only be experienced in the reader's "laboratory of the mind", and that, therefore, should be restricted to the field of philosophical theoretical knowledge. A dynamic found in the investigative process that allowed us to reach a better understanding of the Cartesian doubt was to adjust this framework of Descartes' interpreters to the level of understanding of important scholars who deal with the epistemology of thought experiments in contemporary philosophy. But in order for us to reach this result, we had to make, throughout this investigation, a “painful” return, however necessary, which made us go back millennia to distinguish the old skepticism from the new modern skepticism inaugurated by Descartes. This path enabled us to obtain a coherent interpretation of how the First Meditation should be understood. It is characterized as a type of attitudinal philosophy, which demonstrates that instead of a descriptive or discursive theory found in this Meditation, what we actually have is an active position on the part of the meditator: it is like a musical score that needs to be performed . Therefore, the thought experimenter critically and orderly evaluated all the implications introduced to him in the scenario, and what resulted from this mental manipulation was his encounter with himself: the knowledge of the contemporaneity between thinking and existing. Cartesian doubt is a tool that is not integrated into the finished work, although it is essential for its construction. Its realization is outlined between oppositions in thought and not between forces that operate in concrete reality. Doubt is constituted as a method, a voluntarily simulated perception. Efficient and theoretical, it must function for a period of time in the logical sphere, but then it must gradually be extinguished.

The presente work is divided into two main parts: 1) to understand the poetry openness
and its location in arts from the thought of Martin Heidegger 2) to establish a
relationship between poetry and thoughts the conversation between Heidegger and René
Char. Heidegger says that the way of being of the artwork is responsible for putting the
truth of the being because, in it, the way of historical references and the fate donated to
a historical people is open for its to emerge. Poetry (Dichtung), by manifesting in
language (Sprache), allows the opening of the being in an inaugural way, considering
that it is in language that the appropriate event (Ereignis) appears as testimony; in other
artistic manifestations, the opening of being led to language. Heidegger thinks of the
truth from the Greek word (Alétheia), the unveiling of the being, that is, the clearing
(Lichtung) that unveils be in time. If through language the clearing of being appears, we

will use a poem’s Char to demonstrate how this event is produced. The dialogue
between Char and Heidegger is justified by the common themes of their leftovers, for
example: (a) the notion of openness as a constitutive element of understanding; (b) a
language is clearing of being; (c) both criticize modern technique and the age of
calculability that marks our time in the world. From these points in common we extract
the possibility of conversation between the authors, as it will allow the entry into the
dichten-dinken relationship thought by Heidegger. While Char beckons to the unknown
that a poetic language opens up, contradicting the time of calculation and the experience
that we are submerged; Heidegger, by questioning the being's dwelling place, allows it
to manifest itself as thought, dragging thought towards overcoming the calculability of
existence.

This work investigates David Hume's and Derek Parfit's bundle theories and their
criticisms of the concept of personal identity. In the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume
shows us that personal identity is a problematic concept, and in his famous Appendix he
tells us that it is an unsolvable problem. We highlight in this work his mitigated
skeptical thinking and his criticisms of John Locke who defended personal identity as
the maintenance of the same memories. Hume's criticisms of the identity of bodies, the
identity of perceptions and the personal identity based on the maintenance of the same
memories imply his conclusion that the self is just a bundle of perceptions. Hume also
claims that this bundle is the object of moral sentiments. In this work, we will also
analyze the theory of the self as a bundle in Parfit's philosophy, highlighting his book
Reasons and Persons, which takes up several human criticisms to the identity of bodies
(material identity) and the sameness of memory, or of the mind (psychological identity).
Parfit is a contemporary heir to Hume's skeptical thinking for his skeptical conclusion
that personal identity is not what matters. For Parfit, a person could be defined as
successive selves over time without presupposing personal identity. Furthermore, these
successive selves can accept fissions and fusions in their thought experiments called
puzzling cases. His puzzling cases imply that no criteria would solve the problems
found in the concept of personal identity. Unlike Hume, who only saw the unsolvable
problems surrounding the concept of personal identity, Parfit seems to go a step further
by substituting the concept of personal identity for the relation R to explain survival and
ground his moral philosophy. Furthermore, the constant use of thought experiments
(similar to Locke) shows us a certain differentiation between the way these two
philosophers dealt with the same problem. Finally, we will compare Hume's and Parfit's
bundle theories to understand how these skeptical critiques of the concept of personal
identity relate to their moral philosophies.