Banca de DEFESA: JOSÉ ALFREDO MELO DOS SANTOS

DANIEL DENNETT'S FUNCTIONALIST THESIS: The mind as software running in the brain

Brain. Dennett. Meme. Conscience. Mind.

This project aims to examine the problem of the mind-brain relationship – an ontological and ancient dispute examined today not only by philosophy, but also by other areas of research, such as neuroscience, cognitive science and artificial intelligence – from the perspective of the American philosopher Daniel C. Dennett. Based on his 1991 text Consciousness Explained, we will follow the trajectory that led him to consider consciousness as a nest of memes, a pandemonium of useful fictions. We will see how, in his thinking, he seeks to subjugate the Cartesian dualism (and all its legacy) by presenting us with a double-sided physicalism, reflected in the software-hardware relationship. Initially, we will address some interfaces that serve as validities to support Dennett's homuncular functionalism. As a result, we will carry out a brief examination of research carried out in cognitive sciences, neuroscience and Darwin's thesis on the evolution of species, as well as verify how Dennett makes use of discoveries in these areas. In addition, we will analyze a resource widely used by philosophers in theory building – the so-called thought experiments. Next, we will address three of Dennett's main concepts in the construction of his theory of consciousness, namely: the heterophenomenological method; the meme; and intentional systems. Finally, the reactionaries to Dennett's theory, according to which we highlight John Searle and David Chalmers, will be the object of study. We will conclude our exposition with an examination of Dennett's theory of identity, the self. Apparently, Dan Dennett's thinking is a good introductory resource for any researcher who wants to venture into this very complex topic that is the nature of conscious intelligence.